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INTRODUCTION
This conference, celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the
Feminism and Legal Theory Project, presents a welcome opportunity
to reflect on prior work and consider new directions. This essay will
first discuss why it is important for feminists to focus on torts as a field.
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; Visiting Professor, Boston
University School of Law; Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School. Many thanks to the
editors and staff of the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the
Law and to the organizers of the Twentieth Anniversary Celebration of the Feminism
& Legal Theory Project. I am grateful to Joshua Scott and David Goldberg for
excellent research assistance, to Deborah Tuerkheimer for reviewing drafts, and to
George Chauncey, Martha Fineman, Sally Goldfarb, Julie Goldscheid, Quince
Hopkins, and Liz Schneider for useful comments.
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Second, the essay will outline some broad approaches that feminist
legal theory can take.
The approaches outlined here are
acknowledging context and “asking the woman question[s].”1 Third,
I will apply these approaches to various aspects of torts. This leads to
suggestions for changes in the ways we think about torts, as well as in
some statutes that relate to torts.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF TORTS FOR FEMINISTS
Feminist legal writers have directed little attention to tort law,
compared with family law, criminal law, and constitutional law. This
lack of emphasis is unfortunate, since tort law deserves attention for
many reasons.
Torts is a key mechanism of compensation for, and deterrence of,
injury in the United States.2 Torts has important normative and
narrative roles. Prosser and Keeton famously claimed, “[p]erhaps
more than any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a
battleground for social theory.”3 Tort law is concerned with a wide
range of individual injury and recognizes a wide range of harms, from
emotional harm, to dignitary harm, to physical harm.
Tort law has dealt, at times, in a more nuanced way than many
might expect with issues of gender difference.4 Torts has a flexible
methodology, namely common law adjudication.
Torts has a
decentralized, egalitarian decision-making system—the jury (for cases
that get that far).5 The torts enforcement mechanism depends only
1. Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836-37
(1990) (defining “asking the woman question” as a technique that identifies and
examines elements of existing legal doctrine that overlook disadvantaged women).
See generally Regina Austin, “Bad for Business”: Contextual Analysis, Race
Discrimination, and Fast Food, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207 (2000) (stressing the
importance of context in evaluating racial stereotypes in economic transactions and
giving racial discrimination within the fast food industry as an example); Regina
Austin, Of False Teeth and Biting Critiques: Jones v. Fisher in Context, 15 TOURO L.
REV. 389 (1999) (stressing the significance of context in evaluating law); Leslie
Bender, Teaching Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 115, 118-21 (1994) (suggesting ways to frame questions to analyze the extent of
gender bias in torts casebooks and course materials).
2. See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and
Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 395 (2000) (stating that tort law’s major
goals are inducing effective and efficient deterrence and compensation).
3. THE LAW OF TORTS 15 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
4. See Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 18601930, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 86-87 (1998) (using three categories of cases to
analyze tort law’s intricate interaction with gender difference: 1) women injured as
passengers in cars and wagons; 2) women injured as drivers of wagons; and 3) women
injured boarding and disembarking from trains). See generally BARBARA YOUNG
WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD
REVOLUTION 1865-1920 (2001) (analyzing lawsuits against the railroads and their
results in terms of race and gender).
5. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624-25 (1991)
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indirectly on the state, since enforcement is through private lawyers
bringing contingency fee cases.6 This system has limitations. For
instance, tort litigation generally is not pursued when the defendant
lacks attainable assets or liability insurance. This system also has
strengths. For example, during the period shortly after the end of
slavery and through the end of Jim Crow, black women and men
sometimes were able to find lawyers to successfully sue railroads and
other defendants for their physical and dignitary injuries.7 These
plaintiffs rarely would have been able to hire a lawyer on an hourly
basis. Their successful lawsuits held railroads and other defendants
responsible for their actions in ways that the state would not have
done during this era.8 Tort law, if effectively enforced, would provide
compensation for harms such as those recognized in the now-defunct
civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act; indeed,
almost all cases brought under that provision also included
intentional tort claims.9
Although tort law does not talk much about equality or
discrimination, it does talk about changing behavior, injury, and
harms, all central feminist concerns. All of these aspects make tort
law an interesting area for study and reform. Individual self-

(discussing the role of the jury as the “principal fact-finder, charged with weighing
the evidence, judging the credibility of witnesses, and reaching a verdict”); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (stating that “[j]ury service preserves the democratic
element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued
acceptance of the laws by all the people”).
6. This is not to suggest that the state is uninvolved in the torts system. See, e.g.,
Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific
Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
73, 74 (1994) (arguing that courts’ admission into evidence of race-specific and
gender-specific economic data in torts cases is unconstitutional state action).
7. See, e.g., Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. Geiger, 64 So. 238, 240 (Fla. 1914) (upholding a
second jury award for damages awarded to a “colored” man injured while getting off
and back onto a train); Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. Geiger, 60 So. 753, 757 (Fla. 1913)
(reversing a jury verdict for a black plaintiff); Wilson v. Singer Sewing Machine Co.,
113 S.E. 508, 510 (N.C. 1922) (upholding a jury verdict for a “colored woman” for
assault and trespass by Singer’s agent). See generally WELKE, supra note 4 (analyzing
lawsuits against the railroads and their results in terms of race and gender). See, e.g,
Jennifer Wriggins, The Color of Injury: Race, Gender, and Torts in the First Half of
the Twentieth Century (2004) [hereinafter Wriggins, The Color of Injury] (work in
progress, on file with author) (showing that, despite the mechanisms of exclusion
from participation in virtually all aspects of the legal system, blacks brought and won
tort lawsuits throughout the first half of the twentieth century).
8. See WELKE, supra note 4, at 323-75 (outlining judicial decisions that applied
the common law, rather than state or federal laws, to require equal treatment of
passengers by common carriers).
9. See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 134
n.64 (2001) [hereinafter Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts] (noting that the
majority of the seventy-three reported cases brought under the Violence Against
Women Act included intentional tort claims).
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determination and autonomy are important assumptions in torts,10
and in that sense tort law is inadequate to those who believe that law
should not reflect such assumptions.11
II. GENERAL APPROACHES
This essay discusses some of what feminist perspectives can provide
in connection with torts.12 Very broadly, feminist legal theory looks at
pertinent aspects of torts through a lens that pays attention to gender
and race.13 One of the projects of feminist legal theory is to explore
and acknowledge the contexts in which law operates. A second aspect
of feminist legal theory’s work is to ask questions about how law
affects women in their diversity. Third, feminist legal theory can,
through acknowledging context and asking questions about how law
affects women and others, develop ideas for legal reform. The last
twenty years of feminist legal thinking and theorizing have taught us
that law and its workings are very complex. Broad-brush analyses of
the tort system as “male,” have turned out to be too simplistic. More
nuanced understandings may lead to creative changes.
Torts scholarship and teaching sometimes assume that an
acontextual approach to reading cases is sufficient for understanding
torts. In reading appellate decisions, the fodder of torts courses and
much of torts scholarship, we learn nothing about the parties except
10. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556 (Okla. 1979) (noting that
“Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thoroughgoing self-determination,
each man considered to be his own master”).
11. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY 28-30 (2004) (arguing that current legal and social systems create false
images of autonomy and mask genuine subsidies, and should be replaced by a system
which more equitably distributes responsibility for dependency).
12. I am using “feminist perspectives” generally to refer to the techniques of
acknowledging context and asking the woman questions. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text. This is not meant to exhaust the term “feminist perspectives.”
Nor is it meant to suggest that these techniques are exclusively the province of
feminists. Obviously, as much scholarship has discussed, the category of “women” is
not monolithic, and equally obviously the technique of contextualizing need not be
limited to women’s concerns. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 1241, 1296-99 (1991) (exploring the race and gender dimensions of violence
against women of color by focusing on battering and rape, the way in which
experiences of women of color are frequently the product of intersecting patterns of
racism and sexism, and how these experiences tend not to be represented within the
feminist or antiracist discourse); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 160-67
(1989) (arguing that black women are sometimes excluded from feminist theory and
antiracist policy discourse because both are predicated on a discrete set of
experiences that often does not accurately reflect the interaction of race and gender).
13. Part III.A of this essay is part of a larger project examining the roles of race
and gender in tort law during the first half of the twentieth century. See generally
Wriggins, The Color of Injury, supra note 7.
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what is in the opinion. The parties’ genders may be mentioned but
are rarely considered significant, while the parties’ races are generally
not discussed at all. Gender and race, the dominant view seems to be,
do not matter and never have mattered. This essay challenges that
assumption.
The next section of this essay, which applies tools of feminist legal
theory to torts, has two main parts. First, it explores two appellate tort
cases that highlight issues of gender and race in ways bearing on
classic torts issues of damages and liability.14 Acknowledging the
context of gender and race leads to the observation that torts cases, by
their determinations of liability and damages, both reinforce and
challenge racial and gender hierarchies. Asking the woman questions
with race in mind in connection with these cases leads to a focus on
how tort cases have endorsed or challenged racist traditions of
“protecting” white women from blacks, particularly black men.
Second, this essay examines the almost total absence of domestic
violence from the torts lexicon, despite its obviously tortious nature.
“Asking the woman questions” in the context of torts leads to a focus
on domestic violence. Focusing on domestic violence as a torts issue,
this essay presents an argument for mandatory insurance covering
injuries from domestic violence.
III. APPLICATIONS
A. Injury, Liability, Gender, and Race
1. Recognizing Status Injury to White Women: Gulf, Colorado & Santa
Fe Railway v. Luther
The field of torts mushroomed in the early twentieth century in the

14. The cases discussed here do not discuss the meaning of race. Discussion of
the complex litigation and issues involving racial identity and status is beyond the
scope of this essay. See generally John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie
Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural
World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2160 (1992) (arguing that “race” is a term without a
fixed meaning); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination
in the Nineteenth Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 118 (1998) (analyzing trials of
racial determination to suggest “a more complex interplay between legal and cultural
meanings of race” evidenced through trial testimony going beyond ancestry to
ordinary people’s understanding of race and their place in the racial hierarchy);
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1993)
(investigating the relationship between the concepts of race and property and
showing that rights in property are contingent upon race); Peggy Pascoe,
Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of “Race” in Twentieth-Century
America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 44, 46 (1996) (noting that although many think they know
what “race” means, it is difficult to define and has various meanings depending on
context).
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wake of the myriad of injuries associated with industrialization.15
Negligence law, it is commonly said, evolved to deal with those
injuries.16 These injuries involved harm inflicted in public places by
mechanisms of industrialization, such as railroads.17 Law involving
railroads often turned on the duties of “common carriers,” which
varied from state to state and which originated in the duties of inns
and other private institutions that had important public functions.18
Race and gender play major roles in some of these opinions.
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway v. Luther was a 1905 Texas
appellate court decision in which the husband of a white woman sued
a railroad carrier for his wife’s emotional damages allegedly suffered
as a result of an insult by a “negro woman” who was employed by the
railroad as an attendant in the “ladies’ waiting room.”19 The decision
upheld the then large sum of $2,500 awarded by the jury against the
railroad.20 The “negro woman” was never named. Larger railway
stations during Jim Crow had a colored waiting room, a white waiting
room, and a separate waiting room for white women.21
The facts, as described by Mrs. Luther, were that while she was in
the ladies’ waiting room with her four children, one of her children
spilled a glass of water.22 When Mrs. Luther told “the negro woman”
that the child did not know water was in the cup:
[S]he turned on me with an angry look, and said, “the child did
know water was in the cup” . . . . Then she said to me, “If you say

15. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
16 (2003) (describing the evolution of negligence in tort law); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE
ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING
OF AMERICAN LAW 8, 59 (2004) (describing the evolution of accident law).
16. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 16 (discussing how tort law developed to
accommodate new injuries and duties associated with advancements in
transportation, mills, dams, carriages, and ships).
17. See id. at 16-17 (illustrating the then-new concept of negligence in Brown v.
Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (N.H. 1873), where a passing train startled horses that then
damaged private property).
18. See WELKE, supra note 4, at 324-25 (explaining the evolution of the common
law for common carriers and describing nineteenth century common carriers as
privately owned companies that served the public by transporting people from one
place to another).
19. 90 S.W. 44, 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
20. Id. at 45.
21. See WELKE, supra note 4, at 276-77 (showing and describing the floor plan of
larger train stations). The many issues involved with Jim Crow public transportation,
which of course was famously upheld in Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), are
beyond the scope of this essay. See generally CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM
CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT (1983) (examining the struggle to
end segregation in Southern transportation); WELKE, supra note 4, at 323-75
(discussing the law of racial segregation).
22. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 46 (accepting the exact testimony of Mrs. Luther, while
omitting all testimony of the black attendant).
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the child did not know that the water was in the cup you are a liar.”
I then said to her, “I have not been accustomed to be treated this
way by colored people.” She then replied: “I am used to your kind.
I meet up with them every day.” During the conversation she was
standing right over me, shaking her finger right in my face, and
looking vicious and angry. She stood over me about five minutes,
and said many things to me that I cannot remember, as I was very
much frightened at the time.23

The part of the decision on appeal that is material here dealt with
the duties of common carriers to protect passengers from “violence
and insult from whatsoever source arising.”24 Even though Mrs.
Luther did not sustain any physical injury, her mental suffering was
deemed compensable because the injury resulted from the common
carrier’s breach of duty.25 The “negro woman” testified differently,
but the jury believed Mrs. Luther’s testimony which, according to the
appellate court, was “corroborated by other circumstances” not
specified.26
This case presents fascinating gender and race issues that eclipse
the commonplace doctrinal issues. Doctrinally, given the broad
duties of common carriers, it is likely that Mr. Luther would have
recovered some amount had the waiting room attendant been
white.27 A plaintiff suing a railroad for an employee’s insult did not
have to prove that the employee actually committed a tort such as
assault before prevailing against the railroad for an injury.28
However, gender and race play critical roles in the case in at least
the following four ways. First, the plaintiff was in the ladies’ waiting
room.29 This type of waiting room, common in the early twentieth
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Id. (accepting the jury’s findings of fact as true without further explanation).
27. See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 3, at 57-58 (stating,
[t]he earliest appearance of anything like a separate cause of action for the
intentional infliction of mental suffering was in cases holding a common
carrier liable for insulting a passenger. . . . [The] decisions rest the liability
upon the special obligation of the carrier to the public. . . . [I]n this field the
decisions have gone to considerable lengths [to impose liability]).
28. See id. (explaining that cases holding common carriers liable for insults to
passengers by employees were the beginning of the creation of a separate cause of
action for intentional infliction of mental suffering); see also Haile v. New Orleans
Ry. & Light Co., 65 So. 225, 225-26 (La. 1914) (holding the streetcar company liable
for an employee’s statement to a passenger that she was a “big fat woman”); Lipman v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 93. S.E. 714, 714 (S.C. 1917) (reversing the dismissal of a
claim wherein a railroad employee called a passenger a lunatic, told him he belonged
in a lunatic asylum, and that he would have given him two black eyes had he been off
duty).
29. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 46 (explaining that the complainant was waiting with
her children while her husband attended to business matters).
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century South, was reserved for white women, their children, and
white male escorts (generally husbands).30 Trains also had “ladies’
cars” reserved for white women, and middle class black women sued
train companies when denied access to ladies’ spaces on trains.31
White women and men zealously guarded their racially separate
spaces.32
Second, the plaintiff in the lawsuit was Mr. Luther, not Mrs. Luther.
Mr. Luther sued for injuries to his wife.33 Married women under
common law, even privileged white women, could not sue in their
own names for their own injuries.34 However, Texas did not adopt
the common law rules limiting women’s rights at marriage and
instead adopted the civil law on marriage from Spain.35 Thus, it
seems that Mrs. Luther technically could have sued in her own name
but that cultural factors perhaps prevented this.
Third, the court’s rhetoric is redolent with paternalistic solicitude
for the “frail, delicate, sensitive” white woman and her mental injuries
at the hands of the “threatening negro.”36 The court rhetorically
asked:
[W]hat could be more humiliating to a frail, delicate, sensitive
woman, with a babe at her breast and her other little ones around
her, than to be pounced upon, vilified, and traduced by a negro
servant in a railway depot, where her relation as passenger to its

30. See WELKE, supra note 4, at 276-77.
31. See id. at 289-90 (presenting the facts of two cases where black women filed
suit against railroad companies after they were removed from white-only ladies’ cars).
32. See id. at 280-322 (theorizing how white men and women tried to preserve
their status and the racial hierarchy by maintaining socially defined public spaces,
such as white and colored sections of the train).
33. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 45 (referring to Mrs. Luther throughout the opinion as
“Mr. Luther’s wife” or the “plaintiff’s wife”).
34. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2161-71 (1996) (determining that the passage of the
Married Women’s Property Acts modified the common law prohibitions that
included forbidding wives from suing in their own names, and that these prohibitions
often were given a narrow construction).
35. See, e.g., Dickson v. Strickard, 265 S.W. 1012, 1021 (Tex. 1924) (noting that
“the old common-law principles invoked against [a female candidate for governor]
have never been in force in Texas, and certainly are not in force at the present
time”). The court in Dickson also noted that Texas adopted civil law on marriage
from Spain when it adopted the common law in 1840. Id. at 1022. See also Barkley v.
Dunke, 87 S.W. 1147, 1147 (Tex. 1905) (holding common law rules defining putative
wives not applicable in Texas). See generally Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First
Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1081 n.17 (1994) (noting that Louisiana and Texas had community
property systems during the antebellum period).
36. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 48. See generally Martha Chamallas & Linda K.
Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 814
(1990) (arguing that the law of torts has often failed to compensate women for harms
not commonly alleged by men, such as emotional, fright-based injuries).
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owner entitles her to be treated with respect and kindness? Is it any
wonder to those who can contemplate the effect of such an outrage
that the poor woman for months afterwards, as she testified, could
not close her eyes without that angry, threatening negro arising
before her and murdering sleep.37

The black attendant’s actions are described as violent, in explicitly
race-based terms: “to be pounced upon, vilified, and traduced by a
negro servant in a railway depot.”38 The image of white women as
acutely sensitive to emotional upset and pain, common in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, is on full display in this
opinion.39
Fourth, the harm is constructed based upon the idea that the race
of the servant and the victim combine to make the victim’s harm
worse. In fact, as the court notes, Mrs. Luther could not “close her
eyes without that angry, threatening negro arising before her and
murdering sleep.”40 In this last sentence, the gender of the attendant
is left out, and the court gives us an image of an “angry, threatening
negro,” 41 which, in theory, could refer to a male or female person.
However, the term “negro” often referred to black men in particular,
so this creates a trope of an “angry, threatening negro” man.42 The
court’s description masculinizes the female attendant. And this
“angry, threatening negro” is murdering—sleep!43 The court uses
stereotypes of black males as criminals threatening white women to
endorse the significant damages that Mr. Luther won.44 It is more
humiliating, more upsetting, to be insulted by a black attendant than
a white, the court’s language implies. Race and gender determine the
injury in this case.45 The decision imposed on the railroad a duty to
37. Luther, 90 S.W. at 48.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., WELKE, supra note 4, at 125-36 (describing the stereotype of a
fragile, acutely sensitive white woman).
40. 90 S.W. at 48.
41. Id.
42. Courts sometimes used the term “negress” to describe a female black woman.
See, e.g., Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1959)
[hereinafter Bullock II] (stating that although the appellant’s wife looked white, she
was a “Negress”).
43. See Luther, 90 S.W. at 48.
44. See id. (describing the various things a jury can consider when finding
damages in the form of mental anguish, such as humiliation, wounded pride, and
mental suffering).
45. I am not suggesting that the case is only about race and gender. There was
tremendous anger at the railroads during the height of Jim Crow, such that all-white
juries sometimes ruled against them in favor of black people’s injury claims. See
Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow, 2000
UTAH L. REV. 267, 276 (explaining that during the Jim Crow era, there were other
factors, such as railroad pricing discrimination and terrible train disasters, that led to
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uphold racial hierarchy, since the court held the railroad liable for
failing to protect white women from threats to their superior racial
status.
2. Undermining Sexualized Racism through Duty and Liability:
Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.
Duty in negligence law depends on foreseeability of risks.46 As
Justice Cardozo wrote in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., “[t]he
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.”47 Duty
may depend on foreseeability of risk but what a foreseeable risk is can
depend on how decisionmakers see the social context. In Bullock v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., the Fifth Circuit, through its analysis of
duty and liability, created a challenge to racial and gender
hierarchies, albeit an equivocal one.48
The events giving rise to the injury and the lawsuit deserve careful
attention. In 1957, Reverend and Mrs. Bullock, a married couple
from Jamaica, on a bus trip to see the United States, got on a bus in
Miami and sat in the front.49 “The husband was dark or black, while
the wife, though a Negress, appeared to be a white woman.”50 A
white passenger near Miami complained about where Reverend
Bullock was sitting.51 The driver told Reverend Bullock of the
complaint and asked him to move to the back of the bus, which he
did not do.52 Later, after the Bullocks had traveled north to within
ninety miles of Tallahassee, a white man overheard the driver telling
someone at a bus stop about the presence of this couple in the front
of the bus.53 He bought a ticket, got on the bus and assaulted the

a general societal anger at all railroad companies); see also Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. Geiger,
64 So. 238, 240 (Fla. 1914) (affirming the reversal of a jury verdict that had been
favorable to the black, injured plaintiff). See generally WELKE, supra note 4, at 99-100
(describing society’s growing disdain of the railroads’ overwhelming concern for
profit and not for human cost).
46. See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 3, at 356 (explaining the intersection of
duty, obligation, and risk in negligence cases). The editors note “in negligence cases,
the duty is always . . . to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in light
of the apparent risk.” Id.
47. 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
48. See Bullock II, 266 F.2d at 332 (holding a common carrier liable for injuries
inflicted upon black passengers due to their race).
49. See id. at 328.
50. Id. Although the Fifth Circuit was clear that Ms. Bullock was a “Negress,” the
trial court described her as simply white. See Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,
162 F. Supp. 203, 204 (N.D. Fla. 1958) (stating the “husband is colored and the wife is
white”) [hereinafter Bullock I], rev’d, 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959).
51. Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 204.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 205.
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Bullocks.54 They later sued the bus company for their injuries.55
Although the plaintiffs lost at trial, the appellate court ruled in the
Bullocks’ favor, saying:
[T]his court will take judicial notice (as the district court should
have done) of the commonly and generally known fact that the
folkways prevalent in Taylor County, Florida . . . would cause a
reasonable man, familiar with local customs, to anticipate that
violence might result if a Negro man and a seemingly white woman
should ride into the county seated together toward the front of an
interurban bus.56

According to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, the Bullocks had
successfully established that the company had a duty to protect them,
and that the company had breached the duty.57 The case was
remanded for consideration of damages.58
The duty of the carrier, then, was specific to that time and place,
and was specifically based on anticipating racist attacks.59 All of the
bus company’s witnesses stated that this was the first time they knew of
a black man and a white woman sitting together on a bus or train in
that region.60 The attacks should have been anticipated, not simply
because a black person was sitting in the front of the bus, but because
the combination of a “Negro man and a seemingly white woman”
sitting together in the front was obviously incendiary.61 The Fifth
Circuit recognized this as a risk-creating combination of people,
This recognition is perhaps not
space, and circumstances.62
surprising given the historical confluence between race, sex, and
54. Id.
55. Id. at 204.
56. Bullock II, 266 F.2d at 332. Taylor County, Florida, is a coastal county
Southeast of Tallahassee. The major city, Perry, is fifty-one miles from Tallahassee.
The trial court was located in Tallahassee.
57. See id. at 331-32 (ruling that the danger to the Bullocks should have been
reasonably foreseen by the bus company, giving them time to act to avoid passenger
injury).
58. Id. at 332.
59. Id. at 331 (noting that the bus company had issued bulletins in 1953 and 1956
warning drivers of the possibility of racial disturbances and stating further the
strength of this case as an example of a situation where the bus drivers and the bus
company should have anticipated the danger to the Bullocks).
60. See, e.g., id. at 332 n.1 (describing the situation through the statements of the
actual assailant, Milton Poppell, who plainly noted that black people had their own
place, which was neither sitting in the front of the bus nor marrying a white woman).
During this time, Florida had a statute prohibiting interracial fornication which was in
effect until struck down by the Supreme Court in 1964. See McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964).
61. Id. at 332.
62. Id. at 331-32 (stating that the character and infliction of injury in the
circumstances were reasonably expected).
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social control that figures so prominently in the context of rape and
criminal law.63
By contrast, the trial court ignored the volatile gender-race
confluence and saw this assault as a fluke, as unforeseeable, and
therefore something for which the bus company should not be
liable.64 Bus companies, although common carriers, were not liable
for unprovoked and illegal assaults by fellow passengers.65 The trial
court wrote:
Plaintiffs try to take this case out of the law established in the
decision of the Supreme Court of Florida cited above by arguing
that because of the attitude of the South toward integration carriers
of passengers should anticipate assaults and adopt measures to
protect passengers therefrom. The evidence in this case completely
refutes the contention of plaintiffs in this regard. Integration in
transportation has now been in effect in Florida and elsewhere in
the South for approximately four years and the undisputed
evidence in this case is to the effect that insofar as the carriers, both
railway and bus transportation, are concerned, this is the only case
in which an unprovoked assault of this nature has occurred. . . .
The colored people, by an overwhelming majority, prefer to be
segregated and voluntarily segregate themselves on public
transportation. The testimony is that it is a rare occasion when a
colored person, riding on public transportation, insists upon the
right to sit among white passengers, but where such right is
asserted, no violence, except in this case, has ever occurred in this
state or any of its adjoining states.66

To the trial court, the harm was unforeseeable, and thus the
company had no duty to prevent it.67
63. See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
103, 103-04 (1983) [hereinafter Wriggins, Rape] (arguing that the legal system’s
treatment of rape has disproportionately targeted black men for punishment and
made black women both particularly vulnerable and without redress through the
denial of the reality of women’s sexual subordination by creating a social meaning of
rape, which implies that the only form of illegal rape involves a black offender and a
white victim).
64. See Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 205 (pointing out the rarity of racial violence on
buses).
65. See, e.g., Hall v. Seaboard A.L.R. Co., 93 So. 151, 154 (Fla. 1922) (directing a
verdict in favor of the railroad in the passenger’s claim for damages for injuries
sustained while she was riding overnight on the railroad’s train).
66. Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 205; see BARNES, supra note 21, at ix, 11, 40, 62, 104
(evidencing that despite the trial court’s views, and despite the fact that few blacks sat
in the front of the bus immediately after racial segregation of buses was declared
illegal, segregated public transportation was one of the most hated forms of
segregation for Southern blacks and was resisted well before and throughout the Jim
Crow period, with numerous instances of violence against blacks who refused to move
to the back of the bus).
67. See Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 205 (stating that the Supreme Court of Florida
has already settled the issue that the bus company is not liable to the passengers for
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Both views about duty and foreseeability of risk are dependent on
opposing empirical conclusions drawn by courts. The trial judge,
physically located much closer to the events than the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, stated that black people “voluntarily” segregate
themselves on buses (presumably at the back), so that this kind of
situation rarely arises, but claimed that when it has arisen it has never
led to violence.68 To the Fifth Circuit, this was a situation where
“mischief was hovering about,” so the bus company had a duty to
prevent foreseeable harm.69 Duty here is situated in contrasting views
of risk, race, gender, and social reality.
The court in Bullock recognized and tried to compensate for injury
by racists. The case challenges sexualized racism because it suggests
that a white woman and a black man should be able to safely sit in the
front of a bus together. It spreads the risks and costs of racist injury
and creates an economic incentive for actors like bus companies to
prevent racist injury. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit’s list of
“precautions” the company should have taken to prevent the harm
presents a more limited view of the case’s challenge to racism.70 For
example, the company should have told the driver to inform visiting
foreign blacks (like the Bullocks) of the South’s segregation
traditions, and “should have explained to the Bullocks his reasons for
wanting them to move.”71 The driver also should not have revealed to
the assailant “the Bullocks’ position on the bus [or] their apparent
color and lack of color.”72 These statements raise the following
question: if the driver had told them his reasons for wanting them to
move to the back of the bus, but they had refused and gotten
assaulted by a passenger, could the bus company then argue that their
stubborn conduct in refusing to move somehow barred recovery on a
contributory negligence or assumption of risk type theory? Actually,
despite these statements about what the company should have done,
the Fifth Circuit does not take them very literally. After all, Mr.

the illegal and unprovoked assault by another passenger).
68. Id.
69. Bullock II, 266 F. 2d at 331.
70. See id. at 332 (suggesting various ways in which the bus company should have
given advice to black passengers wanting to travel in the South).
71. Id. It is not clear where exactly the seemingly white Mrs. Bullock “belonged.”
The Fifth Circuit suggests the driver should have told the Bullocks why they both
should move to the back of the bus. Id. If she truly was white, she did not “belong”
in the back of the bus. The trial court, by contrast, found that only Rev. Bullock was
asked to move to the back of the bus. Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 204. Mrs. Bullock
apparently was treated as white by the driver in that she was not asked to move back.
Id. The assailant told them both to move to the back of the bus before assaulting
both of them. Id. at 204.
72. Bullock II, 266 F. 2d at 332.
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Bullock was informed of a passenger’s complaint and was asked to
move, but he had refused.73 He testified that he was aware of
segregation customs but understood that they had been abolished.74
He and his wife may have wanted to sit in the front of the bus for a
variety of reasons, and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion can be read as
saying that they had a right to do so. To use the language of torts, the
common carrier had a duty to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to
them while seated together in the front of the bus, and if the carrier
failed to do so, the carrier would be liable for ensuing harm.75
3. Conclusion
“Protecting” white women is central to the decisions in Luther and
Bullock. In Luther, the plaintiff’s wife was supposed to be protected
from men, particularly working class and black men, by being in the
ladies’ waiting room. The court portrayed the plaintiff’s wife as a
helpless female who the railroad failed by letting her be verbally
attacked by a black person, which caused a traumatic harm to her
status as a white woman. In Bullock, the Bullocks were attacked
because Mrs. Bullock looked white, Mr. Bullock looked black, and
they were together in the front of the bus. The Fifth Circuit’s belief
that “mischief was hovering about” specifically related to the risk that
white people would act violently on the belief that a white woman
always needed protection from a black man. This risk was seen as so
obvious that the bus company was liable for the racist man’s attack on
the Bullocks. Both cases have to do with how white, racial, gender,
and spatial prerogatives are protected or not. The white woman’s
supposed-to-be-safe zone in the Luther train station was protected by
the imposition of liability and the award of damages, while the front
of the bus as a zone that white women would never have to share with
black men was weakened by the imposition of liability in Bullock.
Luther and Bullock contain complex, important narratives about race
and gender exemplifying ways that tort concepts like foreseeability
and injury are embedded in context.76
73.
74.
75.
76.

Bullock I, 162 F. Supp. at 204.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., JENNY BOURNE WAHL, THE BONDSMAN’S BURDEN: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY 88-90 (1998) (arguing that slave
law was important in the development of the “last clear chance” doctrine and in
expanding notions of valuing harm to human beings); WELKE, supra note 4
(discussing race and gender in the context of tort lawsuits against railroads);
Schlanger, supra note 4, at 85 (concluding that gender difference was and remains
important in determining the standard of care in accident cases). Additional work
will continue this exploration. See, e.g., Wriggins, The Color of Injury, supra note 7
(showing that despite the mechanisms of exclusion from participation in virtually all
aspects of the legal system, blacks brought and won tort lawsuits throughout the first

2005]

TOWARDS A FEMINIST REVISION OF TORTS

153

B. Domestic Violence
1. Tort Law and Scholarship’s Omission of Domestic Violence
The feminist practice of “asking the woman question[s]” in the
context of torts leads to analysis of domestic violence as a torts issue.77
Tort law and scholarship have largely ignored domestic violence,
despite the fact that domestic violence is obviously tortious, consisting
of torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. These are largely not analyzed as
tortious harms in contemporary torts scholarship and law
Acknowledging some theoretical, doctrinal, and economic context
helps explain why that is so.
Two main reasons seem to be responsible for the omission. First,
since the early twentieth century, the field of torts has been
conceptualized as pertaining primarily to accidental injury that causes
harm to strangers—the prototypical tort is physical injury caused by a
railroad. Second, there are very few reported tort cases concerning
domestic violence injuries to even analyze, because of a combination
of several factors. I will discuss each in turn.
First, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and others
influentially theorized about the grounds of liability for industrial
injury in the early twentieth century.78 They implied that intentional
torts were largely a thing of the past and a vestigial remnant of an
earlier time.79 At the time they wrote, interspousal immunity was in
full swing and the notion of the white woman as the “angel in the
house” was in force.80 Women were excluded from participation in
half of the twentieth century); see also Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, I.Q.,
Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure Litigation, 77
B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1081 (1997) (arguing that court orders subjecting mothers of leadexposed children to nonconsensual IQ and psychological tests reflected
deterministic, racist assumptions).
77. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 837 (describing the method of asking questions
to identify the implications for women from certain rules and practices).
78. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
467 (1897) (explaining that the torts of today involve injuries from railroads and
factories while the existing law of torts comes from the “old days of isolated,
ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like”); see also ROSCOE POUND, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 85 (1922) (explaining that “civilized men”
can assume no one will intentionally harm them, and that a society of civilized men is
necessary for division of labor, but that “the savage must move stealthily, avoid the
skyline and go armed”).
79. See Holmes, supra note 78, at 471-72 (proposing a change in the theory of
torts law from the generally accepted view that the plaintiff must show a right for
recovery to the view that damage should be actionable through the danger inherent
in the act as manifested through common experience).
80. See, e.g., VIRGINIA WOOLF, WOMEN AND WRITING 59 (Michele Barrett ed.,
1979) (describing the “angel in the house” as a pure, sympathetic, charming,
unselfish, woman who mastered the “difficult arts of family life[,] sacrificed herself
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the legal system in all sorts of ways. When ex-wives sued ex-husbands
for torts committed during the marriage, courts urged them to
“forgive and forget,” no matter how egregious the tort.81
Largely in the last third of the twentieth century, interspousal
immunity was gradually eviscerated.82 Spouses or ex-spouses are now
free to sue each other for torts committed during marriage.83
However, the overall focus of torts did not change. Tort law and
scholarship have continued to focus on accidental injury, ignoring the
important fact that a wide range of injuries that were previously
noncompensable, are now compensable. The 1999 introduction to
the discussion draft of the Third Restatement of Torts-General
Principles, for example, states, “[t]he problem of accidental injury is
what many see as the core problem facing modern tort law.”84 Law
and economics scholarship, so influential in torts, sometimes defines
“torts” as consisting of negligence and strict liability, leaving out
intentional torts entirely, even from the definition of torts.85 When
intentional torts are mentioned, they sometimes are grouped with
criminal law or marginalized.86 Part of my project is to underscore
the importance of intentional torts, to examine ways in which the
torts system handles them, and to consider whether there might be
better ways to handle them.

daily[,] . . . never had a mind or wish of her own,” and existed in every house).
81. See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 305-09 (1877) (entering a nonsuit against
the former wife where her ex-husband with friends forcibly kidnapped her and had
her institutionalized in a mental institution). See generally Siegel, supra note 34, at
2119-20 (illustrating a variety of gender, class, and race-based concerns that shaped
the regulation of marital violence during the Reconstruction Era, drawing into
question the social meaning of chastisement’s demise).
82. See Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 60
MONT. L. REV. 101, 101 (1999) (noting that only a few states retain any form of
interspousal immunity); Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA.
L. REV. 359, 435 (1989) (postulating that the courts abandoned immunity because of
refined public policy arguments and not legal arguments).
83. There continues to be suspicion of interspousal tort claims, especially those
that do not involve physical injury. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 55-64 (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW] (discussing the difficulties of recognizing interspousal claims for
emotional distress damages); Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal
Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1286-1342 (1996) (outlining reasons
why courts should be “leery” of interspousal tort claims, especially those that do not
involve physical injury).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 21 (Discussion Draft
1999) (limiting the scope of a project reviewing general theories of torts to accidental
personal injury and property damage).
85. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 182 n.370
(comparing the treatment of intentional and accidental torts in a number of torts
authorities).
86. See id. (describing scholarship that categorizes intentional torts as crimes or
otherwise treats intentional torts as somewhat tangential).
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A second reason why tort law and scholarship can continue to
ignore domestic violence is that there are so few reported tort cases
pertaining to recovery for domestic violence injuries. I reviewed
thousands of cases on Westlaw in summer 2003 and found only thirtyfour tort cases dealing with domestic violence.87 Given the amount of
domestic violence, which, while difficult to estimate is nonetheless
substantial, compared with the number of domestic violence tort
cases, it is clear that the number of cases is many times less than the
amount of domestic violence.88 In terminology used in other areas of
injury, the “claims rate” for domestic violence injury is low.89
There are many reasons why the claims rate is so low. First, statutes
of limitation are shorter for many intentional torts than for
negligence and other claims.90 Domestic violence tort claims by
definition arise from an ongoing relationship so it is completely
foreseeable that victims of domestic violence will be unable to satisfy
short statutes of limitation.
Second, insurance plays a key role, yet one often overlooked.
Money judgments in tort cases generally come from insurance policies
rather than the defendants’ pockets.91 If one is going to understand
the way tort litigation works, it is essential to understand insurance.
One insurance barrier is the intentional acts exclusion, which is
universal in liability homeowners and automobile policies.92 It
provides that if the insured intends an act, there is no coverage for the
act or its consequences. Since domestic violence torts are almost
always intentional acts, it stands to reason that the intentional acts
exclusion will mean that generally there is no coverage for domestic

87. See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence in First Year Torts, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. NO. 4 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6 n.9, on file with author) (cross-indexing
the search terms of domestic violence, assault, and battery while conducting Westlaw
searches). The results showed a low rate of domestic violence torts claims in
proportion to all other torts claims. Id.
88. See id. at 6 (discussing that most torts claims are unintentional torts, and
intentional torts claims are rarely addressed).
89. See id. (arguing that although a very small percentage of torts claims are
intentional, an even smaller percentage of intentional torts claims arise from
domestic violence, therefore little scholarship focuses on domestic violence claims).
90. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 139-40 (stating that
the statutes of limitations for assault, battery, and false imprisonment often are one to
two years and generally are shorter than for negligence).
91. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort
Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 275 (2001) (noting that most lawyers assume
in their procedures that all money judgments in torts cases will come from insurance
policies).
92. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 135-36 (explaining
that if a plaintiff were to bring a claim for intentional torts against a homeowner with
liability insurance, the insurance company would successfully dodge the claim by
arguing that the insurance does not cover intentional torts).

156

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:1

violence torts.
In addition, when interspousal immunity was eroding, liability
insurance companies began to insert “family member exclusions” in
their policies.93 These exclusions, now standard in homeowners and
automobile policies, provide that the insurance policy will not cover
the claim if a family member sues another family member for injury.
Initially, tort doctrine and then insurance worked to bar people,
mostly women, from recovering in tort.
A third barrier to lawsuits for domestic violence torts is that most
potential defendants lack available assets.94 Fourth, in some states,
tort claims must be brought at the same time as divorce claims.95
Additional barriers include a victim/survivor’s reasonable fear of
retaliation or a desire to move forward, lawyer ignorance, or various
other factors.96
In short, tort law and scholarship largely ignore domestic violence
for at least the following reasons: 1) there are few reported domestic
violence tort cases, and 2) a powerful paradigm defines accidental
injury as the central subject of torts, thus ruling out domestic violence
cases. Torts’ “primary goals” of “effective and efficient deterrence and
compensation” are not being met with respect to domestic violence. 97
This failure hurts all victims of domestic violence but particularly
impacts women who comprise most of those who suffer the resulting
physical injury.98
93. Jennifer Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance “Family
Member Exclusions”: Shared Assumptions, Relational and Liberal Feminist
Challenges, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 251, 252-54 (2002) (considering these family
member exclusions as a new form of interspousal tort immunity); see also Gerald D.
Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion
Clause, 60 IOWA L. REV. 239, 239 (1974) (arguing that creating family exclusion
clauses in insurance policies while creating legislation disallowing interspousal
immunity is inconsistent and undesirable).
94. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 137-39 (providing an
example of a house which may be jointly owned, mortgaged, protected by a
homestead exemption, located in another state, or encumbered by preexisting
involuntary liens by the victim and the perpetrator, thus complicating financial
recovery against a defendant).
95. See id. at 140-41 (arguing that bringing tort claims together with divorce
claims can put the plaintiff’s economic or physical survival, or relationship with
children at risk); Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce:
Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 363-64 (1997) (suggesting that
the interplay between the tort claim and the divorce claim can strengthen or weaken
either or both).
96. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 141-44 (examining
other potential needs of the victim as more pressing than a lawsuit, such as caring for
the children or escaping the spouse).
97. See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 395.
98. See Dalton, supra note 95, at 321-22 n.2 (citing data that ninety percent of
heterosexual partner violence reported to law enforcement authorities is committed
by men); Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 123 n.4 (detailing how
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2. Feminist Responses
An overall feminist approach is to ask how we might encourage tort
litigation to address domestic violence torts. Our goals are several.
We want to increase compensation for domestic violence injuries, and
we can do that through litigation. We want to deter domestic violence
injuries, and we can do that through litigation. Feminists have tried
to encourage litigation in other areas, such as by enacting the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act.99 Although
empirical evidence of tort law’s deterrence is hazy, such deterrence is
assumed to be an important goal of tort law and there is no reason
why this should not be true in this area.100 There are several concrete
strategies that may help reach these feminist goals.
Such strategies include first, lengthening statutes of limitation for
intentional torts so that victims/survivors have adequate time to bring
claims. Several states have done this already.101 The second reform is
to make it clear that parties seeking a divorce do not have to assert
their tort claims at the same time.102
The third strategy involves insurance reform. I propose that we
have a mandatory system of liability insurance covering domestic
violence tort injuries.103 The insurance would be part of automobile
insurance so as to spread the costs of these injuries as broadly as
possible.
Automobile insurance policies would not have an
intentional acts exclusion for injuries caused by domestic violence.
women are far more likely to be victimized by an intimate partner than men).
99. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994)
(guaranteeing all women the right to be free from crimes motivated by gender). But
see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600-02 (2000) (holding that gendermotivated crimes of violence were not considered economic activity and that
Congress lacked the authority to enact § 13981 because the statute did not involve
economic activity or interstate commerce under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
100. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:
Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-90 (1994) (reviewing tort law's
effect on formal empirical studies, surveys of physicians and corporate managers,
reports provided by journalists, and the author’s own interview inquiries and arguing
that the strong form of the deterrence argument, though erroneous, supports the
moderate argument that sector-by-sector tort law provides something significant by
way of deterrence).
101. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 176 (describing
California’s statute of limitations, which allows a case to be filed within three years of
the event occurring or from the point upon which the plaintiff should have realized
her injury).
102. See id. at 176-78 (arguing that victims should not have to litigate their tort
claims at the same time as the divorce litigation as it can be perilous to do so, because
family courts may not have the expertise to deal with tort claims, tort claims involve
jury trials and family cases do not, and the risk of double recovery is minimal).
103. See id. at 152-69 (explaining how an insurance policy could cover injuries
resulting from incidents of domestic violence, allowing those injured to seek recovery
though a torts suit against the tortfeasor).
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The policies would not have a family member exclusion. In other
words, harm caused by domestic violence would be covered by liability
insurance. It would have a provision, similar to uninsured motorist
coverage, that would cover a person’s domestic violence injuries when
inflicted by an uninsured person. The justification for making the
insurance mandatory is based on public policy and on data about risk
assessment, and also echoes the reason why automobile insurance is
mandatory. Namely, the injuries caused by auto accidents are too
many and too serious to simply rely on individuals’ decisions whether
to insure or not; people may estimate their risk inaccurately and so
buy insufficient insurance.104 In the area of intimate relationships,
people also estimate the risk of failure with amazing inaccuracy.105
The reasons for an intentional act exclusion do not withstand close
scrutiny, as I have explained.106 Second, an uninsured domestic
violence tortfeasor provision makes sense for the same reason that
uninsured motorist insurance makes sense—so that a person can
make a tort claim with her own insurance company for injury if she is
injured by an uninsured domestic violence tortfeasor. Uninsured
motorist coverage was created in the 1930s and 1940s when there was
a massive surge in injuries caused by drivers who lacked insurance.107
Such coverage now is required in automobile policies in most
states.108 Uninsured motorist coverage, notably, lacks an intentional
acts exclusion.109 Courts analyze the application of the coverage from
the perspective of the insured.110 For example, an act by an
uninsured motorist ramming the insured motorist’s car may be
104. See id. (explicating that, in insurance terms, mandatory insurance lowers the
risk of adverse selection, which is the tendency of people who need insurance most to
buy it, which can lead to too many claims, extremely expensive insurance, and market
failure).
105. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993) (“[T]he median response of the marriage license
applicants was zero percent when assessing the likelihood that they personally would
divorce.”).
106. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 161-69 (arguing that
justifications for intentional acts exclusion as supposedly necessitated by moral hazard
and public policy are not compelling).
107. E.g., ALAN I. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 4, 10 (1969)
(describing development of uninsured motorist coverage in response to public outcry
over an increase in injuries caused by automobile accidents in New York, where loss
from uninsured drivers totaled about seven million dollars a year).
108. See id. at 12 (describing the uninsured motorist endorsement as an
alternative to compulsory motor insurance).
109. See id. (limiting coverage to hit and run drivers or accidents with the
uninsured, and lacking coverage for intentional acts committed by the uninsured).
110. See Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, supra note 9, at 153-54 (explaining
that intentional damage by an uninsured motorist is covered, because the event is
examined from the perspective of the victim, not the perpetrator).
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intentional, but from the perspective of the insured, it is decidedly
not intentional.111 Recovery under the injured person’s own policy is
allowed. This is one reason why uninsured motorist coverage holds
promise as a model.
If this plan is adopted, we can expect to see actions by insurance
companies trying to reduce the incidence of domestic violence.
Domestic violence may be seen as more of a societal issue than an
individual issue and there may be more of a collective response than
currently prevails. While many may object to this approach, it has the
advantage of spreading the costs of domestic violence more broadly
and compensating more people for domestic violence injuries. Such
an approach should lead to more litigation and thus more deterrence.
CONCLUSION
Torts is ripe for gender-conscious and race-conscious revisions such
as the one begun here. Race and gender have affected the
application of legal concepts such as duty, harm, and injury. Tort
cases have at times reinforced race and gender hierarchies and at
times have undermined them. Persistent paradigms and directions of
inquiry, such as the dominant focus of torts on accidental injury, can
be identified and challenged. A rigorous rethinking of existing
assumptions and directions may open up new avenues of exploration
and possibilities for change.

111. See id.

